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Abstract
We conducted an experimental study in Haiti testing for the relationship be-
tween religious belief and individual risk taking behavior. 774 subjects played lot-
teries in a standard neutral protocol and subsequently with reduced endowments
but in the presence of religious images of Catholic, Protestant and Voodoo tra-
dition. Subjects chose between paying to play a lottery with an image of their
choice, and saving their money to play with no image. Those who chose the former
are defined as image buyers and those who chose the latter as non-buyers. Image
buyers, who tend to be less educated, more rural, and to exhibit greater religiosity,
bet more than non-buyers in all games. In addition, in the presence of religious
images all participants took more risk, and buyers took more risk when playing
in the presence of their chosen images than when playing with other images. We
develop a theoretical model calibrated with our experimental data to explore the
channels through which religious images might affect risk-taking. Our results sug-
gest that the presence of images tends to increase individuals’ subjective probability
of winning the lottery, and that subjects therefore believe in a god who intervenes
actively in the world in response to their requests.
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1 Introduction
How does religious belief affect risk-taking behavior? The question is of great importance
in the modern world, since in contrast to the once-dominant secularization hypothesis,
religious activities are not an archaic vestige of pre-scientific times, doomed to disappear
as education levels rise. Indeed, in the twenty-first century roughly 9 human beings out
of 10 are believers in either a monotheistic or polytheistic system.1 Religious beliefs and
practices are the subject of conscious, reflective choice with considerable consequences for
economic and non-economic outcomes. This paper investigates the link between religious
belief and risk-taking behavior, using an experiment conducted in Haiti, a country with a
high level of religiosity and whose population is exposed to important risks, most of them
uninsured. It thereby contributes to a fast-growing literature on the economic analysis
of religious behavior.
An important strand of that literature analyzes the effect of religion on economic
outcomes via its impact on trust.2 It seems also possible that religion may affect eco-
nomic outcomes through other psychological mechanisms, such as attitudes to risk. The
macro-economic literature, in the wake of Weber (1905), has long recognized the poten-
tial importance of culture, and especially religion, for economic growth. However, most
empirical studies in this literature face a challenge in surmounting endogeneity problems,
and it is generally hard to rule out the possibility that confounding factors explain both
the religiosity of a population and the growth of its economy. For instance, McCleary and
Barro (2006) find in their instrumental variable model that higher GDP per capita causes
a reduction in average religiosity. They also find that the relationship between economic
1According to the World Religion Database, in 2015 the distribution of religious affiliation in the world
was as follows: Christians 33.2%, Muslims 24.0%, Hindus 13.9%, Buddhists 7.2%, other religions 10.1%,
while agnostics and atheists represented solely 9.7% and 1.9% of the world population respectively.
2There is evidence of the role of religion in building social and economic trust, either by inducing
more trustworthy behavior (Norenzayan, 2014; Esteban et al., 2018) or by enabling adherents to signal
to others their trustworthiness (Iannaccone, 1994; Irons, 2001; Bulbulia, 2004) and prosociality Levy and
Razin (2012). This raises the question of what distinguishes more from less intrinsically trustworthy
individuals, and why this should be correlated with religious adherence. One view is that individuals
differ in the degree of utility they derive from what happens to others (Becker, 1974). An alternative view
is that the most significant way in which individuals differ in their trustworthiness is in their willingness
to respect social norms (Fehr et al., 2002; Bernhard et al., 2006). Finally other writers have appealed to
self-image concerns (Brekke et al., 2003; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006), which are not precisely reducible to
combinations of altruism and respect for norms.
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development and religiosity depends on the particular dimension of development. Edu-
cation has different effects than urbanization, for example (McCleary and Barro, 2006).
Even if it were possible to do so in principle, such large-scale studies would have difficulty
pinpointing the mechanisms involved. Experimental methods may therefore be helpful
in establishing causality.
In this paper we report a study of attitudes to risk, in the form of a lab-in-the-field
experiment in which 774 subjects in Haiti played simple lotteries. The participants had
to decide how many tokens from their endowment to invest in a lottery presenting a 60%
chance of doubling the bet and a 40% chance of losing it. They did so both in a standard
protocol (which we call hereafter the “neutral” version) and subsequently with reduced
endowments but in the presence of religious images from the Catholic, Protestant or
Voodoo traditions; these three are the only religions with a substantial presence in Haiti.
Subjects then chose between paying to play a fifth lottery with an image of their choice,
and saving their money to play it with no image. Their choices were secret. We define
subjects who chose to pay to play with an image in the fifth lottery as “buyers”.3
We explore two questions. First, we ask whether buyers as thus defined show different
risk behavior from those participants who did not buy an image. We find that they do:
buyers bet more than non-buyers in all games (neutral and with images). Secondly, we
aim to explore whether the presence of religious images induces a change in the behavior
of subjects, and if so whether the change is greater among buyers than among others.
Once again the answer is yes to the first question, though there is no significant difference
in the magnitude of the change between the two groups.
Next we attempt to explore the mechanisms underlying such behaviors, based on the
standard expected utility maximization (EUM) model with a constant relative risk aver-
3We were also interested in studying trust and religious belief. As part of the same experiment, the
774 subjects also played trust games, both in the standard protocol and with religious images. Their
choices of religious image were secret in the lotteries but observed by anonymous partners in the trust
games. The trust game and the lottery were played in an order that was randomized by session, and
we control in all regressions either for fixed effects or for the order in which the two experiments were
played. The results related to the trust game are presented in our companion paper, Auriol et al. (2019).
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sion Bernoulli utility function. First, we show that our subjects’ behavior is inconsistent
with the assumptions underlying EUM models: it is not simultaneously possible that
their subjective probability of winning the lottery is the true objective probability as
communicated to participants, and that their risk aversion parameter remains constant
throughout the experiment. Secondly, our results suggest that religiosity is associated
with lower values of the risk aversion parameter across individuals, though we cannot
establish the direction of causality. Finally, the presence of images appears to increase
participants’ subjective probability of winning the lottery. This is consistent with beliefs
that God can intervene in the world to deliver an outcome that participants desire (i.e.,
an interventionist God).
Our study contributes to the existing literature, which we discuss below, in two main
ways. First, our experiments involve a large number of ordinary people whom we recruited
by traveling into remote areas of Haiti. In contrast, most other related experiments in-
volve a smaller number of participants and/or students of Western universities. Although
it was highly challenging to run our experiments in Haiti due to the state of its infras-
tructure, we believe it was useful in deepening our understanding of how religiosity might
shape risk taking behavior in a context of low social trust and weak or non-existent social
protection in which most risks go uninsured.4
Secondly, this experiment is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to elicit a measure
of subjects’ religiosity in an incentive compatible way (i.e., through the price they pay
to play with a religious image). In other studies, subjects are asked to self-declare their
religion, but there is no mechanism for collecting information on the intensity of their
beliefs. Yet some people are more religious than others, and if for some reason, those
who are more religious also belong to a particular denomination (for instance Muslim
immigrants in advanced economies), then experiments might attribute their results to a
4Chen (2010) finds that religious participation acts as a form of social insurance in Indonesia following
the 1997-98 financial crisis. Wickham (2005) reports that religious organizations provide social services
and states that “Islamic mobilization in Egypt occurred on the periphery of the formal political system
in settings removed from state control.” In the case of Haiti, informal institutions, such as religious
communities during earlier history and more recently NGOs, substitute for some of the formal institutions
of the state (Delisle, 2003, Hurbon, 2004).
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religion, while in reality they might simply reflect different levels of faith correlated with
the subjects’ religion. In fact we do not find any significant denominational differences
in what follows. But we do find a strong effect of the intensity of our subjects’ religiosity,
as measured by their propensity to pay for religious images, on their risk taking behavior.
The paper is structured as follows. We present in Section 2 a review of the literature.
We continue in Section 3 with a description of the Haiti field setting and the experimental
procedures. Section 4 presents the experimental results, and Section 5 presents a theo-
retical exploration of the channels of the religiosity effect. Section 6 concludes.
2 Religion and risk-preferences: links with the liter-
ature
Economists and psychologists have developed a variety of experimental methodologies to
elicit and assess individual attitude towards risk (see Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008, Dave
et al., 2010 and Charness et al., 2013 for surveys). The variance in the type and struc-
ture of the lotteries used in experiments is large. In particular, some methods are more
cognitively demanding than others, which might be a problem in a developing countries
such as Haiti where literacy is generally low.5 Dave et al. (2010) analyze how and when a
simpler but coarser elicitation method may be preferred to a finer but more complex one.
Their results, based on a sample of Canadian residents of different age groups, indicate
that the more complex measure has overall superior predictive accuracy, but its downside
is that subjects exhibit noisier behavior. The authors show that the simpler task should
be preferred for subjects who exhibit low numeracy, as it generates less noisy behavior
but similar predictive accuracy. For subjects with higher numerical skills, the greater
predictive accuracy of the more complex task outweighs the greater noise.
Based on these results we choose for our experiment the Gneezy and Potters (1997)
method, used also in Haigh and List (2005), where subjects endowed with a fixed amount
5The DHS 2012 nationally representative sample shows that 7% of the population has higher education
(i.e., more than secondary education).
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of money make a sequence of simple investment decisions in a risky asset (i.e., they choose
how much to bet from their endowment in a lottery). The advantages of this method are
first, that it is very easy to understand as it builds on subjects’ experience of bingo/lottery
games, and secondly, that it is incentive compatible (i.e., subjects have no incentive to
lie as their choices are secret and affect only themselves). These two advantages explain
our choice in the low literacy, low trust context of Haiti.
Of the many, experimental papers on risk aversion assessment in the laboratory, very
few test the impact of religious priming on subjects willingness to take risk. A noticeable
exception is the paper by Benjamin et al. (2016), which studies, among other things, the
risk attitudes of subjects in terms of a series of binary choices between a sure invest-
ment and a chance of increasingly larger prizes in a framework initially proposed by Holt
and Laury (2002). 827 Cornell University students were enrolled for the experiments.
The authors used a subtle priming method by making the subjects complete a sentence
unscrambling task. The subjects were randomly assigned to complete a religion-salient
or control/neutral sentence unscrambling task. Religion was not mentioned otherwise.
After completing the sentence unscramble, the subjects participated in different games.
The authors assess, within each of the self-declared religious affiliations in their sample,
whether their religious priming treatment affects subjects’ attitude towards risk. They
find that priming causes increase in risky behavior for Catholic subjects, but has no effect
on risk-taking for Protestants.
The role that religious images play in our experiment is not really equivalent to prim-
ing as this is normally understood. Priming occurs when an idea or a concept is brought
subtly to the attention of experimental subjects without being explicitly mentioned and
without any suggestion of relevance to the experiment. In our case subjects are explicitly
told they will play with religious images and in one round are allowed to choose to play
with religious images for a price. There is no suggestion that the odds of the lottery will
be any different, but the choice of subjects to do so is an explicit choice which they may
make for reasons of their own.
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What happens in our experiment is that the subjects first play the lottery in a neutral
context without any mention of religion. Then we successively add, in a random order, an
image of Catholic, Protestant and Voodoo significance in the cup containing the tokens
with which they bet. Participants bet secretly. Consistently with Benjamin et al. (2016),
we find that our subjects increase their bets in the risky asset in the presence of religious
images, but in our case the results are highly significant for all denominations, and there
is no denominational difference in the magnitude of the treatment effect.6 This last re-
sult may reflect the fact that Haiti has no strong divisions across religious denominations:
almost all citizens acknowledge either a Protestant or a Catholic faith (with both groups
open to Voodoo practices to different degrees),7 and that many Haitians appear to switch
easily between denominations.8
One major advantage of our protocol is that it allows us to obtain a measure of our
subjects’ intensity of religious belief (and not just their self-declared religious affiliation).
Indeed at the end of the 4 lotteries (one neutral followed by three with images) we offer
our subjects the opportunity to play another lottery of their choice among the 4. Since
playing in the presence of a religious image involves a cost (either 20% or 30% of their
endowment) the fact that some subjects choose to play with an image is not a cheap
choice. It is revealing of the subject’s attachment to the chosen image, which is strongly
correlated with the subjects’ self declared religion as well as with other self-reported
measures of religious practice. Since almost all participants in our experiments declare
themselves to be religious to some degree, we interpret the difference between buyers and
non-buyers as a difference in intensity of religiosity rather than a difference between the
religious and the non-religious.
6In the financial investment literature Kumar et al. (2011) argue that risk-taking is reduced by
Protestantism, whereas Hilary and Hui (2009) argue that risk taking is reduced by both Protestantism
and Catholicism. In accordance with Kumar et al. (2011), Benjamin et al. (2016) do find that religious
identity norms cause Protestants to become relatively more risk averse than Catholics, but this is because
Catholicism increases risk-taking, rather than Protestantism reducing risk-taking as Kumar et al. (2011)
hypothesize.
7An anecdote during the fieldwork confirmed this characteristic in Haiti. During an interview with
a Catholic priest, the latter said that “In good times, a Haitian is either Catholic or Protestant, and in
bad times, any Haitian is a Voodooist.”
8About 49% of our sample reports to be of Protestant faith, but 50% of these were not born protestant,
having subsequently switched to the Protestant faith.
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Our finding that the presence of religious images lead our subjects to take more risk,
and that more intensely religious subjects take more risk than less intensely religious sub-
jects, is consistent with recent studies showing that beliefs in divine intervention in the
daily lives of individuals can be an important determinant of real and costly social deci-
sions (see Hadnes and Schumacher, 2012; Gershman, 2016; Nunn and Sanchez de la Sierra,
2017). In particular, our results square well with the findings by Nunn and Sanchez de la
Sierra (2017) who document the prevalence of beliefs in protective spells in South Congo,
arguing that these beliefs helped village residents coordinate a stronger resistance against
enemy fighters. If religious priming and religious beliefs lead individuals to be more confi-
dent this should also encourage them to fight harder as they might feel protected by God.
In a recent paper, Bentzen (2018) explores the reverse causality, namely how the
exposure to unbearable and unpredictable situations, such as natural disasters, affects
individual religiosity. The author finds a positive causal relationship at the world level
between religiosity and exposure to earthquake risk, which is exogenous. Interestingly re-
ligiosity increases more in districts with lower average incomes, education, and population
densities. We check this finding in our micro-data sample and find similar results: indi-
viduals’ willingness to purchase religious images, which is a measure of their religiosity,
is correlated with lower education and rural living (i.e., lower density). The explanation
for increased religiosity proposed by Bentzen (2018) is the need to cope psychologically
with adverse shocks, which is known as the religious coping hypothesis. Bentzen (2018)
provides robust evidence in its support. In the context of Haiti, which was hit in 2011
with an unprecedented natural disaster, this would predict an increase in the country’s
religiosity. It leaves open the question, which we aim to explore, of how heightened reli-
giosity affects individuals’ risk taking.
In the last part of the paper we compute subjects’ relative risk aversion parameter
assuming that they are expected utility maximizers and that their Bernoulli utility func-
tion exhibits constant relative risk-aversion. These are indeed the most commonly used
assumptions in the empirical literature, which make our results readily comparable with
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previous work (see for instance Harrison et al., 2010, Liu, 2013, De Brauw and Eozenou,
2014, Verschoor et al., 2016).9 Our experimental data are inconsistent with the fact that
our subjects’ risk aversion and their subjective probability of winning the lottery remain
constant throughout the experiment. They rather suggest that our subjects update their
subjective probability of winning the lottery in presence of religious images. For an in
depth discussion of the empirical relevance of the EUM and CRRA assumptions we refer
the interested reader to the thorough analytical survey of the literature on elicitation of
risk aversion in the laboratory by Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008).
One important issue with experimental data is their external validity. Can we draw
conclusions from what we learn in the laboratory about individuals’ willingness to take
risky gambles in real world situations? The literature suggests that individuals’ attitude
towards risk in the lab is informative about their attitude towards risk in real life situ-
ations. In advanced economies risk aversion measures derived from incentive-compatible
experimental choices such as ours are correlated with measures from hypothetical risky
choices, which in turn predict risky behaviors such as smoking, drinking, failing to hold
insurance, holding stocks rather than Treasury bills, being self-employed, switching jobs,
and moving residences (see Barsky et al., 1997, Guiso and Paiella, 2008, Dohmen et al.,
2011, and Sahm et al., 2007).
In developing countries, research on risk aversion has focused on farmers, who are
generally believed to be risk averse, and neglect their future income when evaluating
each risky decision (Schechter, 2007). An extensive literature analyzes how farmers’ risk
aversion shapes their technology adoption and other saving decisions, crucial for their
economic sustainability (see for example Hurley et al., 2010 for a review). Studies by
Verschoor et al. (2016) and Liu (2013) focus on whether the risk preferences elicited from
the experiments match real world behavior of individuals, for example with respect to
technology adoption, and find a statistically significant link between the two.
9Some of these studies have used lottery games in the field to test whether participants behave
according to Expected Utility Theory (EUT), and whether their risk preferences have a CRRA form
(see Harrison et al., 2010 for a review of evidence from Ethiopia, India and Uganda and De Brauw and
Eozenou, 2014 for a study of farmers from Mozambique).
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In our case, we find that buying an image is correlated with higher risk-taking in the
lotteries. It is also highly correlated with self-declared religiosity, suggesting consistent
findings between the experiment and the survey.
3 The experiment
3.1 Field setting and experimental procedures
Haiti, the first Caribbean state to achieve independence, occupies the western third of
the island of Hispaniola Island, shared with the Dominican Republic. Mountainous with
a tropical climate, it is the poorest country in the Americas due to decades of violence
and instability. Haiti’s Human Development Index value for 2017 is 0.498, which puts the
country in the low human development category, positioning it at 168 out of 189 countries
and territories.10 In Haiti, 50.2% of the population are multidimensionally poor while
an additional 22.2% live near multidimensional poverty. Political instability has been a
characteristic of Haiti’s recent history, with entrenched elites controlling economic and
political power (Naidu et al., 2015). A Gini coefficient on income of 0.6 makes it one of
the most unequal countries on earth.
The study, which was conducted between November 2012 and February 2013, involved
774 subjects in 6 regions of Haiti, who took part in 33 sessions of between 18 and 25 par-
ticipants each. Figure 1 presents a map of the visited regions. Subjects were recruited
from the general population by word of mouth and sessions took place in village halls and
schools, not in religious buildings. When subjects arrived they were randomly allocated
numbers to ensure anonymity and all records were made with respect to their numbers.
They then made a series of experimental choices. We wanted to run two distinct sets of
experiments: one on religiosity and trust and the other on religiosity and risk taking. For
logistical reasons we opted for running the two sets on the same day as coming back later
10This number is below the average of 0.505 for countries in the low human development group and
below the average of 0.748 for countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Source: UNDP Human
Development Report, 2012. See http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends.
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participate to a game involving financial earnings, specifying its location, time and duration. 
Following the rule of first arrived first served, once enough volunteers were gathered, the 
session started. When subjects arrived they were randomly allocated numbers to ensure 
anonymity and all records were made with respect to their numbers. The sessions took place 
in non-religiously affiliated buildings such as village town halls and public schools.  
Figure 3: Map of Haiti  
 
Notes: The red dots defines the areas visited 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a closed-form questionnaire, with help from 
project staff for illiterate respondents, and verification of each questionnaire to ensure that subjects 
had understood the questions. The summary statistics on the socio-demographic of our subject 
pool are presented in the first part of Table 1. We compared social characteristics of 
participants with those of a household survey we conducted six months previously and may 
be more representative of the general population due to a different sampling methodology11. 
The subject pool of our experiments is younger and better educated, had a smaller proportion 
of women and a larger proportion of Protestants than those in the survey. We also compared 
characteristics of participants of participants with those of the nationally representative 
Demographic and Health Survey12 conducted in June 2012. The subject pool of our 
experiments was on average older and better educated, had a smaller proportion of women 
and a better access to electricity. But the proportions declaring themselves Catholic and 
Protestants are similar, with rather more of our subjects declaring themselves Voodooists, 
which is still a sensitive matter in Haiti. We also present the summary statistics for the trust 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 door to door survey questionnaire based on randomized household sampling. 
12 The Demographic and Health Survey is to the best of our knowledge the only available nationally 
representative survey conducted in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and in a period of time close to our 
experimental study. 
Figure 1: Map of Haiti. The red dots mark the locations where the experiment took
place.
to run another set of experiment with a different pool of subjects was too costly in light
of the challenging conditions in the country. We th refore randomized at the session level
the order of the trust game and the lottery; 372 subjects played the trust game first and
402 played the lottery first. We control in all estmations below either for session fixed
effects or for the order of the two experiments.
At the end of the experiment, subjects completed a closed-form questionnaire, with
help from project staff for illiterate respondents, and verification of each questionnaire
to ensure that subjects had understood the questions. The questionnaire sought to elicit
both socio-economic information about each respondent, and also detailed information
about religious beliefs and practices, so as to see whether our subjects’ willingness to
pay to play with images was correlated with other more direct indicators of religiosity.
The complete set of questions on religious beliefs and practices is reported in Appendix D.
We compared characteristics of our subject pool with what is to the best of our knowl-
edge the only available nationally representative survey made in Haiti just after the 2010
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earthquake: the 2012 DHS (see Table 1). Our subjects are on average older and better
educated than the DHS survey respondents, and we had a smaller proportion of women.
But the proportions declaring themselves Catholic and Protestant are similar, with rather
more of our subjects declaring themselves Voodooists, which is still a somewhat sensitive
matter in Haiti.11
3.2 The lottery choices
We ran 33 lottery sessions. Each session of the study involved playing a lottery, first
in a neutral condition and then in an image treatment that included three religious im-
ages: one related to the Catholic religion, one related to the Protestant religion and one
related to the Voodoo religion (see Figure 2), in a random order. These images were
chosen with the aid of religious leaders of each faith. In the pilot sessions we confirmed
that participants unambiguously associated the image with the religion (see figure notes
below). Randomization of order of images was at the session level. Appendix A presents
the detailed experimental protocol.
Participants played five independent rounds of a lottery game. For each round, the
lottery implied a betting decision: subjects were endowed with different amounts of to-
kens depending on the round (as explained below), and were asked to place any whole
number of tokens secretly into a cup. A public draw from an urn containing 6 yellow
balls and 4 black balls determined whether the amounts bet would be doubled (yellow)
or forfeited (black). It was announced at the start of the session that the public draw for
all lotteries would be made at the end, after all the lottery choices had been made. This
means that the results of the earlier lotteries cannot have had any impact on the choices
made by subjects to pay or not to pay to play with an image.
Figure 3 presents the structure of the five rounds of the lottery game in each session.
In the image treatment of the lottery, subjects played the lottery three times with a lower
11Voodoo practice was subject to clandestinity as it was prohibited and punished during various
episodes of the Haitian history. It was recognized as an official religion in 2003, but Voodooists still
suffer from social stigma (Me´traux, 2016; Hurbon, 2004).
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(a) Catholic (b) Voodoo (c) Protestant
The images were attached to plastic cups and presented in the experiment as follows: “We will
play with each one of the three colored cups I have here. Before coming here, we went to visit a
Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor and a Voodoo priest. Each provided us with an image. As
you can see there is a pink one with an image that you will recognize from the Voodoo tradition,
an image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus from the Catholic tradition, a picture of the song book
”chants d’espe´rance“ that most Protestant churches use.”
Figure 2: Religious images of the three religions presented to the subjects
endowment and they all also received, in random order, one of three religious images. The
difference in endowments between the two alternatives was therefore the price they paid
to be able to bet in the presence of a religious image. We proposed one of two prices,
which represented respectively 20% and 30% of the original endowment. These prices
were randomized at the session level.
Lottery Number of tokens
1) Neutral lottery 10 tokens
2) Image lottery 1 7 or 8 tokens
3) Image lottery 2 7 or 8 tokens
4) Image lottery 3 7 or 8 tokens
5) Choice of preferred lottery & tokens for chosen lottery
One draw for each lottery 1) to 4)
Figure 3: Structure of the lotteries
Our goal is to learn whether players prefer to play with 10 tokens and a neutral set-
ting, or to play with 8 tokens (or 7 depending on treatment) and with a religious image.
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To elicit their preference across the four lotteries played, subjects played a fifth round. In
this fifth round, they were asked to choose one of the four previous lotteries (i.e., neutral
or with one of the images). This was done before the lottery draws. Once the players
had decided on the lottery to play again, they would receive the corresponding materials
and endowment: either the endowment of ten without an image (with a blank note) or
the lower endowment with an image of their choice. Players made their choice secretly;
other participants could not observe whether subjects had paid for an image nor what
image they had paid for if so.12 After the materials for this last round were distributed,
players would make their bet choice for this last game.
We thus have, for each subject, a record of their behavior in each of the lotteries, with
and without religious images. We also know whether they were willing to pay to play
with an image, at a price equal to 20% of endowment or 30% of endowment, depending on
the treatment, which was randomized at the session level. The secrecy of image choices
implies that subjects’ behavior in the lottery was not driven by the wish to influence
other participants, nor by peer pressure.
4 Experimental Results
4.1 Characteristics of image buyers
A total of 59.6% of subjects were willing to pay for an image in the lottery. Table 2 re-
ports an econometric estimation of the probability that subjects would buy an image as a
function of various subject characteristics, as well as of whether the session took place in
a rural or urban area and whether the image price was 20% or 30% of their endowment.
Compared to non-buyers, image buyers are more likely to live in a rural area and to be
illiterate, and less likely to be students. However, they are more likely to have a house
made of brick or concrete. These differences indicate that image buyers do not appear to
be either at the bottom nor at the top of the wealth distribution; their decision to buy
does not seem to represent an income effect. Nor do we see any difference between buyers
12See protocol in the appendix on the logistics of the procedure.
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and non-buyers in terms of religious affiliation.13 However, one aspect of religious belief
and practice is clearly associated with image-buying, having a statistical effect almost as
strong as being illiterate or living in a rural area: whether the subject believes that the
last person close to them who died, did so from supernatural causes. The exact wording
of the question was “In your opinion, what was the cause of the death of the last close
person you lost: (i) Natural or (ii) supernatural?” In other words, image buyers believe
more strongly than the other subjects in interventionist gods and spirits.
The most surprising finding in Table 2 is that there is no effect of the image price
on willingness to buy. In fact price of the image not only did not affect buying decisions
but also had no effect on the share of the endowment bet, conditional on buying. This
is shown in Table B4 in Appendix B, which reports the Wilcoxon distribution tests and
mean t-tests comparing shares bet with different images prices. Although the share of
endowment bet was slightly lower in the high price treatment, the difference was both
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
4.2 Comparing bets between Buyers and Non-Buyers
Figure 4(a) shows the distribution of amounts bet in the neutral lottery (which came first,
before subjects played the lotteries with images and therefore before they had to take
decisions about whether to pay for an image or not). It shows that subjects who would
later reveal themselves to be buyers gambled more than the non-buyers, with a mean of
55% of endowment bet for buyers compared to 49% for non-buyers. Figure 4(b) shows
the average share of the endowment bet in the lotteries with images. Here the former
also bet on average more aggressively than the latter, with a mean of 59% for buyers
compared to 51% for non-buyers. In both cases the difference is statistically significant
at the 1% level. Table 3 displays the summary statistics of the lotteries by subjects types
(all, buyers and non-buyers).
When looking at religious denominations we find no statistically significant difference
13Table B1 in Appendix B reports a fuller set of comparisons between buyers and non-buyers with
respect to various characteristics.
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(a) Neutral lotteries (b) Image lotteries
Notes: The figure presents the Wilcoxon non-parametric test on share of bets across the different
samples of subjects. In both figures, we compare subjects that bought the image versus subjects
that did not. The left figure compares the share of endowment bet in the neutral lottery,
and we find that the test is significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon rank test, p-value=0.0062).
The right figure presents the comparison for the shares bet in the lotteries with images. The
difference is also significant at the 1% level (Wilcoxon rank test, p-value=0.0009). There are
more observations in the right figure because there are more games with images than neutral.
Figure 4: Comparison of shares of endowment bet across Buyers and Non-buyers
when comparing the distributions of the bets between them. Table B2 in the Appendix
reports the distribution tests comparing bets with different images and for different image
prices.14 We hence pool the different image lotteries, while controlling for image price in
the various econometric specifications.
We analyze econometrically the determinants of differences in betting behaviour be-
tween buyers and non-buyers. We include in the regressions both session fixed effects
and individual controls. We control for age, higher education, stone house, private
car/motorcycle, own a mobile phone, use of internet, whether the subject is protestant,
catholic, or voodooist. Since Figures 4(a) and 4(b) reveal some evidence of truncation at
0 and 1, we run a Tobit specification:
Cis = β0 + β1Image Buyeris + γXi + δs + εis (1)
where Cis is the choice of individual i playing in session s, defined in shares of endowment
14The only instance in which we find a statistically significant difference is with Voodoo versus Protes-
tant images when image prices are pooled, but this was not significant when we considered the different
treatment groups separately.
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bet, and ImageBuyeris is a dummy that takes value 1 if the player bought an image. Xi
denote individual characteristics, and δs are session fixed effects.
Table 4 presents the results of this estimation. The inclusion of 33 session fixed ef-
fects involves a substantial loss of statistical power. Yet the coefficient on image buyers
is positive and significant. This result is fairly robust.
Column (1) shows the difference between buyers and non-buyers in the neutral lottery:
buyers bet on average 4.7% of their endowment more than non-buyers, a difference that
is significant at the 10% level. The inclusion of individual characteristics, in addition to
the 33 session fixed effects, weakens the result, so that the buyer dummy is no longer
significant in column (2).
Column (3) does the same for the lotteries with images. Here again buyers bet signif-
icantly more than non-buyers: roughly 6% of their endowment more (out of either 8 or 7
tokens) compared to the non-buyers, a difference that is now significant at the 5% level.
Column (4) shows that this result is robust to the inclusion of individual characteristics.
4.3 Comparing subjects’ behavior with and without images
The next question we address is how subjects’ behavior changes when religious images
are included. We compute the difference between the average share of the endowment bet
in the lotteries with images and the share of the endowment bet in the neutral case. We
report the share of the endowment bet rather than the absolute amount since this is the
best method of comparison of betting behavior under different endowments. For instance,
decision makers who are expected utility maximizers with constant relative risk aversion
would bet the same proportion of their endowment whatever the size of the endowment
(for more on this see section 5). As shown in Table 3, on average our subjects increase
their share of endowment bet by 4 percentage points (st. dev = 0.21) in the presence of
religious images and this difference is highly significant (i.e., at a tiny 1% level as shown
in Table B3) .
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The effect appears to be stronger for buyers, who increase their share bet by 4.5
percentage points (st. dev = 0.22), than for non-buyers who increase their bet by 2.5
percentage points on average (st. dev = 0.21). However, as can be seen from the Wilcoxon
test this difference is not statistically significant, which is confirmed by our regressions
(in which we control for session fixed effects) as reported in the two columns of Table 5.
4.4 Image choices
In this section we investigate further the image choices that individuals make. First of
all, we compare the bets made by individuals across the different image lotteries. Next
we consider to what extent their choice of image can be interpreted to reveal information
about their own religiosity.
4.4.1 Image choice and betting
Figure 5a shows that the distribution of bets in the different image lotteries for non-buyers
are almost identical. Figure 5b shows that this is not quite so true for image buyers, and
in particular that the protestant buyers bet slightly more and the voodoo buyers slightly
less than the catholic buyers; these differences are, however, insignificant at the exception
of the comparison of voodoo image pairwise with catholic and protestant. By contrast
when we compare the bets made by buyers in the presence of their own image and the
other images as is shown in Figure 5c, we see that image buyers do bet more in the
lottery with the image of their preference, whatever it is. The average bet by an image
buyer for his/her chosen image is 0.62 (std. 0.27) while the average bet for the other two
remaining images is 0.57 (std. 0.26). These are very significantly different (Wilcoxon test
p=0.0001).
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Figure 5: Distribution of bets in image lotteries
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Notes: The figures show the kernel density of share of endowment bet for the different image
lotteries for buyers and non-buyers.
4.4.2 Image choice and declared religious affiliation
The second issue is whether the image choice observed in the lab informs us about ac-
tual religious affiliation. Table 6 shows that the willingness to purchase images of a
given denomination correlates with subjects’ declaring themselves being members of that
denomination. Of those who purchased either Protestant or Catholic images, nearly
three-quarters declared themselves members of that denomination compared with only
around a third of those who did not purchase either image, and the differences are signif-
icant at one per cent. Also highly significant is the difference between those who bought
and those who did not buy a Voodoo image, though the overall proportions are lower in
both cases because few people were willing to declare themselves Voodoo adherents.
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4.5 Summing up
We have established first, that buyers of religious images are less educated and more
likely to believe in interventionist gods or spirits than non-buyers; secondly that buyers
are more willing to take risk than non-buyers in all settings; thirdly, that all the subjects
are more willing to take risk in presence of religious images; and fourthly, that buyers’
choice of image is strongly correlated with self-declared religious affiliation. These results
are fairly robust. They hint at the importance of the presence of religious imagery in
shaping individual attitudes towards risk.
There are at least two possible channels through which the effect of images could
affect our subjects: via changes in risk-aversion and via changes in the subjective proba-
bility of winning.15 It is not possible based on our experimental data alone to disentangle
the subjective probability from the risk aversion effect. We therefore turn to theory to
explore them.
5 Theoretical exploration of the effect of playing with
religious images
5.1 The general framework
To guide the analysis, we model the choice of the individuals in the lottery by assuming
that they are expected utility-maximizers (EUM) characterized by a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. We show in Appendix C that the optimal betting
strategy b0 in the neutral lottery for an EUM individual with the utility function u(x) =
x1−ρ
1−ρ with ρ > 0 and ρ 6= 1 and a probability of winning p > 0 is:16
b0 =
10(1− q)
1 + q
(2)
15It is of course possible that subjects might be willing to pay to play with religious images for purely
aesthetic or consumption-based reasons. However, if this were the motive it would be hard to understand
why subjects’ betting behavior should change in the presence of images.
16It is easy to check that if p = 0.6 then limρ→0 b0 = 10 and limρ→+∞ b0 = 0, which is consistent with
the range of the bets we observe.
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where
q = min
1,
(
1− p
p
) 1
ρ
 . (3)
Condition (2) is equivalent to:
q(b0) =
10− b0
10 + b0
. (4)
From an empirical point of view, the observation of bi0, the betting strategy of the player
i = 1, ...744, in the neutral lottery allows us to deduce the baseline value of qi0 = q(bi0)
for each subject.
The assumptions underlying expected utility theory are 1) that the subjects believe
in the objective probability of wining the lottery (here that p = 0.6) and 2) that their
risk-aversion parameter ρ is constant. Given these assumptions, the betting behavior of
players who do not update their probability of winning the lottery, nor change their risk
aversion, in presence of the religious image for which they pay a price of t is:
bi(t, qi0) =
(10− t)(1− qi0)
1 + qi0
(5)
If the only impact of playing with an image is an income effect, then individuals
should not change the percentage of their endowment they allocate to the gamble, and
their actual bets bit should be equal to their optimal bets bi(t, qi0).
17 We know from
Section 4 that our individuals bet a larger share of their endowment in the presence of
religious images so that on average bit > bi(t, qi0). Our subjects’ behavior is inconsistent
with the assumptions underlying EUM theory with CRRA functions.
There are at least two possible ways to explain the discrepancy between the empirical
evidence and the model: either participant’s risk aversion decreases or their subjective
17To make comparisons of betting behavior meaningful in the empirical part we computed the per-
centage of the net endowment that each player gambled in each lottery. Let bit be the actual bet chosen
by the player when t ∈ {0, 2, 3} (i.e., 0 in the neutral lottery and either 2 or 3 in the image lottery
depending on the randomized cost). The percentage of the net endowment gambled by the player is then
xit =
100bit
10−t for t ∈ {0, 2, 3}. If individuals were EUM then we should observe xit = xio.
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probability of winning increases when religious images are added to the lottery. We there-
fore explore these two polar cases in turn and discuss their respective relevance in the
light of the existing empirical evidence.
5.2 First possibility: Playing with religious images decreases
risk-aversion
In the first polar case, we assume that the players believe in the objective probability of
winning the lottery. Thus, religious images affect their behavior solely through a decrease
in their risk-aversion. We calibrate the relative risk aversion parameter ρ of our subjects
under the assumption that p = 0.6 for all.18 Our results are summarized in Table 8.
The Table shows that buyers have significantly lower risk-aversion than non-buyers in
all cases (neutral or with images). The “Images” column also shows that all types of
participants (i.e., “Buyers” and “Non-buyers”) have lower risk aversion when they play
in the presence of religious images than without, although due to the sample size in the
neutral case the result is not statistically significant for the image buyers.
Table 8 shows that the average value of the relative risk aversion parameters ρ is 0.49
in the neutral case. We consider the evidence from the literature with respect to both
the magnitude of the risk aversion parameter and its stability over time. With respect to
the magnitude, Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) review the existing evidences on CRRA
parameters and propose their preferred range which is 0.5 to 0.8 (e.g., see Table 8 pp 121
in Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008). The results for our neutral lottery appear therefore to
be consistent with the existing literature, albeit at the low range of what Harrison and
Rutstro¨m (2008) suggest.
By contrast, in the image lotteries the estimates of relative risk aversion are smaller,
especially so for the buyers. For instance the average value of ρ for our whole sample is
18To be more specific, we exploit the betting behavior of the subjects in the neutral lottery, denoted bi0,
to compute qi0 =
10−bi0
10+bi0
. Setting p0 = 0.6 in the neutral lottery, we deduce from (3) that ρi =
log(1.5)
−log(qi0)
for all qi0 ∈ (0, 1). Similarly we exploit the betting behavior of the subjects in the image lottery, denoted
bit, to replace qi0 by qit =
10−t−bit
10−t+bit with t ∈ {2, 3}. We deduce that ρit =
log(1.5)
−log(qit) for all qit ∈ (0, 1)0.
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0.44, and the difference with the neutral case is statistically significant at the 5% level.
This last result is at odds with the existing literature on risk aversion.
With respect to the possibility that risk aversion might change over time, especially
between rounds of an experiment, Horowitz (1992) and Harrison et al. (2005) provide
evidence showing temporal stability of risk attitudes in lab experiments over a period of
up to 4 months. This makes us doubt that changes in risk aversion can be the explanation
for our subjects’ behavior (they played the various lotteries in less than 1 hour). Instead,
our results suggest that individuals update their subjective probability of winning the
lottery in the presence of religious images, an assumption we explore in the next section.
5.3 Second possibility: religious images increase the subjective
probability of winning
Based on the background information we collected through conversations with people in
Haiti (including some Voodoo priests and priestess), we believe the most plausible chan-
nel is that playing with the images changes subjects’ subjective probability of winning
the lottery. When people turn to God or magic, they pray/pay for a positive outcome.19
They do not pray/pay to become more tolerant of failure and risk. In particular, accord-
ing to Voodooist beliefs, those who follow faithfully the will of their own loa (voodoo
spirit) will be aided by the loa, and those who ignore the will of their own loa will be
punished (Simpson, 1978). The idea of interventionist spirits is thus deeply embedded in
the belief system of Haitians and our image buyers are more prone to such beliefs than
non-buyers (e.g., they tend to believe more than non-buyers that death is supernatural).
In the second polar case, we therefore assume that subjects’ relative risk aversion
parameter, computed in the neutral baseline case, remains constant throughout the ex-
19Before the early modern era, the concepts of randomness and chance were intertwined with that of
fate and God’s will. They were for instance discussed by the Greeks and the Maya with no mathematical
foundation. It was only in the 16th and 17th centuries that Italian and French mathematicians began to
discuss the outcomes of games of chance as ratios, which are not intuitive concepts for mathematically
illiterate people.
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periment, while their subjective probability varies.20 Once we have for each individual a
measure of their relative risk aversion parameter we compute their subjective probability
of winning the lottery in the image treatment. Indeed, in the lottery with religious images
we have qit =
10−t−bit
10−t+bit where bit is subject i’s actual bet for price t ∈ {2, 3}. We deduce
from (3) that the individual subjective probability of winning is:
pit =
1
1 + qρiit
. (6)
A summary of our computations is in Table 9. The average subjective probability of
winning the lottery in the image treatment is 0.66, which is statistically different (at the
1% level) from the baseline value 0.6. In presence of religious images all types of players,
buyers and non-buyers alike, overestimate their probability of winning, but the effect is
stronger for Buyers. The latter overestimate their probability of wining by 6 percentage
points on average (which is 10% of the baseline value) while Non-buyers overestimate it
by “only” 5 percentage points (a difference significant at 5%).
In the wake of the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), there has been a
considerable body of research studying people’s perceptions of probability and risk. This
literature has uncovered many systematic errors humans make in judging the probabilities
of uncertain events. The brain’s tendency to find patterns results in heuristics or rules
that have consistent bias (see Kahneman et al., 1982). In particular, empirical studies
have shown that decision makers do not usually treat probabilities linearly; they tend to
overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones. Our analysis suggests that
individuals’ subjective probability of winning a lottery, in addition to being possibly non
linear, is influenced by subjects’ religious belief. Individuals who are devout Christians
or voodooists might hold the belief that they will be rewarded by favorable outcome from
god/spirits. If this is true in our setting, there is a good chance that it is true in other
settings as well, especially in regions of the world such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
20To be more specific, we exploit the betting behavior of the subjects in the neutral lottery game,
denoted bi0, to compute qi0 =
10−bi0
10+bi0
∈ [0, 1]. Setting p0 = 0.6 in the neutral lottery, we deduce from (3)
that ρi =
log(1.5)
−log(qi0) for all qi0 ∈ (0, 1). It is worth noting that this direct approach to computing ρi gives
an average value of ρ which is 0.49 (see the mean value of ρi in Table 9).
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America, characterized by a high level of religiosity and beliefs in interventionist God
(Auriol et al., 2017).
6 Discussion
Our experiments show that buyers of religious images, who on the basis of other evidence
appear to be more strongly religious people, take more risk in lotteries than non-buyers,
who appear to be less religious. Our experiments also show that in the presence of reli-
gious images all subjects are more willing to take risk. From a methodological point of
view, EUM/CRRA models assume that individuals believe in the objective probability
of winning the lottery and that their risk-aversion parameter is constant throughout the
experiment. Yet our results robustly show that at least one of these assumptions does
not hold when adding religious images to the experiment design. This raises the question
of how both religiosity and the presence of religious images (in other words, both tem-
perament and circumstances) might affect individuals’ willingness to take risk. There are
indeed at least two possible channels as illuminated by the theory: risk aversion and the
subjective probability of winning.
Since the existing literature shows that risk aversion is a rather stable characteristic
of individuals’ preferences, and that people are unable to judge the probabilities of un-
certain events accurately, our empirical results suggest that playing with religious images
increases individuals’ subjective probability of winning the lottery, consistently with the
fact that some of them believe in interventionist gods or spirits. Indeed, the average
value of the subjective probabilities of winning implied by the betting behavior of our
subjects in the image lotteries is significantly higher than the baseline value (at the 1%
level). This study is just a first step towards understanding the channels through which
religion affects risk taking behavior. More experimental work is needed to confirm that
one of them is through modifying subjective probabilities, as appears to be the case in
our experimental setting.
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Tables
Table 1: Comparing experimental sample with general population
Experimental sample DHS 2012
Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean
Rural 774 0.50 0.50 0 1 0.62
Female 774 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.52
Age 774 31.66 11.65 15 79 24
Illiterate 774 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.18
High school 774 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.40
Higher education 774 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.07
Protestant 774 0.49 0.50 0 1 0.49
Voodooist 774 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.01
Catholic 774 0.42 0.49 0 1 0.04
Access to electricity 774 0.57 0.50 0 1 0.379
Use Internet 774 0.43 0.50 0 1
Own mobile phone 774 0.88 0.33 0 1
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics of our experimental sample conducted
in 2013 with the nationally representative sample of the Demographic Health Survey
conducted in 2012.
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Table 2: Probability of buying image as a function of various
subject and session characteristics
(1) (2)
Image Buyers
Rural 0.09669**
(0.0455)
Female -0.06235 -0.04140
(0.0524) (0.0549)
Age -0.0004008 0.0005031
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Illiterate 0.1480** 0.1731**
(0.0633) (0.0724)
Student -0.06867 -0.04035
(0.0472) (0.0468)
Higher education -0.005732 -0.02925
(0.0462) (0.0486)
Use internet -0.05728 -0.06349
(0.0471) (0.0470)
Catholic -0.01857 -0.005244
(0.0905) (0.0917)
Protestant -0.05685 -0.06380
(0.1018) (0.1010)
Voodooist -0.06955 -0.03354
(0.1210) (0.1240)
Belief in supernatural death 0.08493** 0.06139+
(0.0397) (0.0381)
Private car/motorbike 0.0003925 -0.02076
(0.0497) (0.0502)
Own a mobile phone 0.06112 0.01544
(0.0525) (0.0598)
Stone house -0.006337 -0.01444
(0.0426) (0.0433)
Brick or Concrete House 0.07200* 0.05295
(0.0402) (0.0410)
Primed -0.04415
(0.0486)
Cost of Image 0.02881
(0.1211)
Order of lotteries: Prot, Cath, Vod 0.1489
(0.1210)
Order of lotteries: Vod, Cath, Prot 0.1296
(0.1425)
Region FE Yes
Session FE No Yes
Observations 774 774
R2 0.0497 0.1122
Notes: Probit regression; marginal effects reported. Robust standard
errors clustered at session level (33 sessions) in parentheses. Cost of Image
equals 1 if price of image is 3 tokens and 0 if it is 2 tokens. In the order
of lotteries the omitted group is Cath, Vod, Prot.
** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10, + p < 0.15.
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Table 3: Average share of the endowment bet
Mean/SE Wilcoxon test
All Image Buyers Non-Buyers p-values
Neutral 0.52 0.55 0.49 0.0062
(0.27) (0.26) (0.28)
Mean Images 0.56 0.59 0.51 0.0009
(0.26) (0.24) (0.29)
Difference between Image (mean) 0.04 0.04 0.025 0.1673
and Neutral games (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
Voodoo 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.0700
(0.31) (0.30) (0.31)
Protestant 0.57 0.61 0.51 0.0000
(0.30) (0.28) (0.32)
Catholic 0.57 0.60 0.52 0.0007
(0.30) (0.29) (0.32)
N. 774 461 313
Notes: The table presents the summary of the bets in each of the lotteries, expressed as share of the en-
dowment, by type of players. The neutral lottery was the one without any image, and Voodoo, Protestant
and Catholic are the mean bets for the lotteries with Voodoo, Protestant and Catholic images respectively.
Mean Images reports the average share bet in the 3 lotteries with images. The last column reports signif-
icance tests (Wilcoxon rank-sum test) of the difference of the distribution for image buyers compared to
non-buyers.
Table 4: Share of endowment bet in the lotteries - session fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neutral lottery Mean image lotteries
Image buyer 0.04682* 0.04319 0.06015** 0.05881**
(0.0275) (0.0277) (0.0266) (0.0275)
Constant 0.4006*** 0.5616*** 0.5228*** 0.6252***
(0.0226) (0.0619) (0.0220) (0.0761)
Session FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual Controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 774 774 774 774
Pseudo R2 0.2856 0.3028 0.5136 0.5296
Notes: Tobit regression. Robust standard errors clustered at session level (33
sessions) in parenthesis *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10. Controls include:
age, higher education, stone house, private car/motorcycle, own a mobile phone,
use of internet, protestant, catholic, and voodooist.
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Table 5: Difference in bet in the lotteries - session fixed
effects
(1) (2)
Difference between
Image (mean) and Neutral games
Image Buyers 0.01140 0.01288
(0.0177) (0.0177)
Constant 0.1283*** 0.06692
(0.0146) (0.0471)
Session FE Yes Yes
Individual Controls No Yes
Observations 774 774
R2 0.0899 0.0987
Notes: OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered at session
level (33 sessions) in parenthesis *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p <
0.10. Controls include: age, higher education, stone house, private
car/motorcycle, own a mobile phone, use of internet, protestant,
catholic, and voodooist.
Table 6: Proportions declaring religious affiliation
by image bought
Image Buyer
Protestant Catholic Voodoo
Mean/SE
Protestant 0.743 0.205 0.141
(0.44) (0.405) (0.350)
Voodooist 0.025 0.051 0.219
(0.156) (0.221) (0.417)
Catholic 0.199 0.731 0.594
(0.400) (0.445) (0.495)
Other religion 0.033 0.019 0.062
(0.179) (0.137) (0.244)
N. 241 156 64
Notes: The table reports the means by images of buy-
ers who declared religious affiliation in the post-experiment
questionnaire corresponded to the image in question.
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Table 7: Model calibration: baseline results
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variables
qi0 774 0.36 0.26 0 1
qit 774 0.32 0.25 0 1
Risk aversion
ρi0 659 0.49 0.39 0.14 2.02
Notes: qi0 =
10−bi0
10+bi0
where bi0 is subject i’s actual bet in the
neutral lottery and qit =
10−t−bit
10−t+bit where bit is subject i’s actual
bet for price t ∈ {2, 3}, and ρi0 = log(1.5)−log(qi0) for all qi0 ∈ (0, 1) is
the relative risk aversion parameter based on individuals’ bet in
the neutral lottery.
Table 8: Implied risk aversion parameter if p = 0.6
Neutral lottery Image lottery ttest
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean neutral/image
All 659 0.49 1770 0.44 0.015
Buyers 400 0.46 1068 0.42 0.026
Non-buyers 259 0.52 702 0.48 0.229
ttest buyers/non-buyers (p-value) 0.073 0.000
Notes: Let qit =
10−t−bit
10−t+bit where bit is subject i’s actual bet for price t ∈ {0, 2, 3}. The risk aversion
parameter is computed for a CRRA utility function and p = 0.6. In the neutral case (first column)
ρi0 =
log(1.5)
−log(qi0) for all qi0 ∈ (0, 1). In the image lotteries (second column) ρit =
log(1.5)
−log(qit) for all
qit ∈ (0, 1) with t ∈ {2, 3} depending on the randomized price of images. A test of equality of the
average value of the risk aversion parameter for buyer and non-buyer, Ho: ρb = ρnb, is presented in
the line “ttest buyer/nonbuyer” Similarly a test of equality of the average value of the risk aversion
parameter in the neutral and in the image lotteries, Ho: ρ0 = ρt, is presented in the column “ttest
neutral/image.”
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Table 9: Implied subjective probabilities of winning with images
Neutral lottery Image lottery ttest
Obs. Mean Obs. Mean neutral/image
All 659 0.6 1977 0.66 0.000
Buyers 400 0.6 1200 0.66 0.000
Non-buyers 259 0.6 777 0.65 0.000
ttest buyers/non-buyers (p-value) 1 0.02
Notes: Let qit =
10−t−bit
10−t+bit where bit is subject i’s actual bet for price t ∈ {0, 2, 3}. The risk aversion
parameter is fixed at its baseline value: ρi0 =
log(1.5)
−log(qi0) for all qi0 ∈ (0, 1). The subjective probability
of winning then is pit = 1/(1 + q
ρi0
it ) with ρi0 defined above and t ∈ {0, 2, 3}. A test of equality of
the average value of the subjective probability of winning for buyer and non-buyer, Ho: pb = pnb, is
presented in the line “ttest buyer/nonbuyer” Similarly a test of equality of the average value of the
subjective probability of wining in the neutral and in the image lotteries, Ho: p0 = pt, is presented
in the column “ttest neutral/image.”
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Appendices
A Experimental Protocol
A.1 Introduction:
Before the start of the experiment, 25 seats are arranged in the experiment room. When-
ever possible, all experimental materials are kept in a nearby room out of the view of the
participants. Where that is not feasible, materials are hidden at the end of the room out
of the participants’ sight.
Once the participants enter the room, they are seated. All the explanations of the
experiment director are in creole.
Experiment director (ED afterwards): Thank you for coming. We are a group of uni-
versity researchers from Toulouse, in France and Quisqueya University. We thank you
for coming to this session. Please let us start by giving you very important information
for the game.
In a flip chart that will be in view of the participants view during the whole game, the
experiment director proceeds to write each of the rules: anonymity, secrecy and serious
thought. In the meantime, the assistants distribute the ID numbers.
ED: The first rule we will follow is Anonymity. No personal information will be re-
vealed. You are now given a number in your ID tag; please attach it to your t-shirt. We
will never ask you your name; all your decisions will be recorded only with this number.
The second important rule is Secrecy. Since all decisions are private, nobody should try to
look at anyone else’s choices. And the third norm is Serious thought (re´fle´chi). You need
to think seriously about your choices, as real money is involved. You have the possibility
of making money, and how much you actually earn depends on your decisions.
The first set of experiment coins is distributed (for the first game) together with the
box/cup corresponding to this game to make it easier for the experiment director to ex-
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plain the value of the experimental coins.
ED: You have some plastic coins in your hand, right? You should know that 1 coin=1
point and 1 point=2 gourdes (it is written here on the flip chart).21 Then, it is important
for you to think about all decisions since that will affect the payments received at the end
of the game. Clear for everybody? Any questions?
Figure 6: Rules of the game
Then, let us proceed if that is clear for everyone. You are allowed to leave the room
at any time you may wish to; this is a voluntary activity. If you leave before the end of
the session, we will not be able to calculate your payments.
A.2 Elements included in the experiment: Images and ordering
effects
The experimental session consists of two components: A lottery and a trust game. The
images used in both elements are the same for comparability. The structure of each
is similar: first a “neutral” version is played, and afterwards it is re-played after the
introduction of the images. To check whether the first view of the images affects results,
we randomized the order of the two elements.
21The gourde is the Haitian currency. The payments were calculated so that on average participants
would receive around 200 gourdes for a 2- to 3-hour experiment, equivalent to the official minimum wage
for an 8-hour day for textile workers.
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A.2.1 Lottery
Neutral version
The players receive a white paper cup with 10 poker tokens.
ED: Let us start with the first (second) game. You have received a paper cup with 10
tokens inside. Please put the tokens in your hands and count them. How many do you
have? Does everyone have 10 tokens? Perfect! Then let me remind you (showing the flip
chart) the value of the tokens: 1 token is 1 point, and each point is worth 2 gourdes. Also,
let me remind you that all we do here is anonymous: that is why cups have a number that
is the same that the number you have handing on your t-shirt.
ED: Now, let me explain you how this game will work. All the tokens you do not put
in the cup, are yours to keep. Here you all see a bingo globe that contains 10 balls: 6
yellow and 4 black.
To make sure that it is seen by all participants, a drawing of the cage is made on the flip
chart.
ED: Your task is to decide how many of the coins to put into the cup. Why? At the
end of the session, we will get a ball out of the bingo globe: if it is yellow, whatever is in
the cup will be doubled, but if it is black everything they did put in their cup is lost.
A diagram of what happens for each choice is displayed on the flip chart.
ED: Clear for everyone? Perfect! Now please make your decision as to how many
tokens to put in the cup and how many to keep for yourself. The ones you keep for
yourself, remember, are already yours, and each has a value of 2 gourdes. For the ones
in the cup, we will see what happens with the bingo globe.
ED: Ok, thank you. Now my assistants will pass to collect the cups and the tokens
you did not put in the cup.
Assistants pass to collect the cups and the tokens. The collection is made discreetly to
as to ensure no participant can guess the actions of the others.
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(a) White cup and tokens (b) Flip chart (c) Bingo cage
Figure 7: Presentation of the settings (a), (b) and (c)
Table 10: Order and cost of protection at the risk game
Session number S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
Cost of protection 2/10 2/10 3/10 2/10 2/10 3/10
Pink Yellow Blue Pink Yellow Blue
Order of the games Yellow Blue Pink Yellow Blue Pink
Blue Pink Yellow Blue Pink Yellow
Note: Blue: Catholic, Pink: Voodoo and Yellow: Protestant
Image versions
Three colored cups with the images presented in Figure 2 are presented together: a
yellow cup for the Protestant image, a blue cup for the Catholic image, a pink cup for
the Voodoo image.22
ED: Let’s continue. What we will do now is, instead of playing with a white cup, we
will play with each one of the three colored cups I have here. Before coming here, we went
to visit a Catholic priest, a Protestant pastor and a Voodoo priest. Each provided us with
an image. As you can see there is a pink one with an image that you will recognize from
the Voodoo tradition, an image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus from the Catholic tradition, a
picture of the song book “chants d’espe´rance” that most Protestant churches use. Please
count the number of tokens you were given in the cup. You can see that you have 8 (or
7) tokens, so 2 (or 3) less coins than in the first game without an image. However, the
logic of the game remains unchanged. Now you can play the same game but with these
different cups, and that at the end we will take out one ball from the bingo globe for each
22Decisions are not affected by the color of the cup but solely by the religious image it corresponds to.
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game.
Special care is taken to make sure all participants understand that the lotteries are in-
dependent, and that each participant has the same probability of winning. In the image
lotteries the order of the cups is randomized to control for ordering effects, and we also
changed the cost of protection as a control for different sessions. The procedure of each
of the cups is the same as for the white cup: players count the pieces (8 or 7 depending
on the cost of protection at their session), make their choice, cups and un-bet tokens are
collected.
Choice of preferred lottery
Once the four lotteries are played, the participants are given a white cup with 8
(or 7) tokens depending on the treatment. An experiment assistant presents near the
experiment director a box that contains copies of the three images, white cards and ex-
perimental tokens.
ED: Now you are allowed to play one more game: you can choose from the 4 games
you just played the one you would like to play again. You all have a white cup with tokens,
right? Can you please count them? Then, what do you miss if you would like to play
the white game? (answer: 2 or 3) And if you want to play the colored games? (answer:
0) In this box that my assistant will bring to each of you, there are the images and there
are white cards and tokens. You see the box has a cover so that your neighbors cannot
see your choice. Then, if you want to play the pink game again, you take the Voodoo
image. If you want to play the blue game again you take the Sacred Heart. If you want
to play the yellow game you take the picture of the sons book. If you want to play the
white game, you take the white card and two-three tokens. Clear for everybody? Great,
then my assistants are coming to each of you with the boxes.
The experiment assistants pass near each participant with the box so each participant
can make his/her choice. In Figure 8 the box is designed so that the choice is private and
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cannot be observed by other participants.
(a) Box for the choice (b) Presentation of the different
options
(c) Explanation of the choice
Figure 8: Design of the secret box (a), (b) and (c)
ED: Perfect, now that you all made your choice of which game you want to play again,
we will actually play it. So please, as before, decide how many tokens you want to bet
leaving them in the cup, and how many you want to keep. My assistants will come to get
cups and tokens.
After the participants have made their choice of lottery they are willing to play and have
decided how many tokens they want to bid in this lottery, cups with the chosen card and
the tokens are collected as are the tokens not played. The bingo globe is turned four
times, once for each of the lotteries, and the results are written on the flip charts.
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B Additional tables and figures
Table B1: Characteristics of Image Buyers and Non-Buyers Compared
(1) (2)
Non-Buyers Buyers Difference
Variable N Mean/SE N Mean/SE (1)-(2)
Rural 313 0.441
(0.028)
461 0.540
(0.023)
-0.099***
Female 313 0.329
(0.027)
461 0.297
(0.021)
0.032
Age 313 31.109
(0.613)
461 32.043
(0.567)
-0.935
Use internet 313 0.470
(0.028)
461 0.406
(0.023)
0.064*
Education:
Illiterate 313 0.035
(0.010)
461 0.063
(0.011)
-0.028*
High school 313 0.572
(0.028)
461 0.536
(0.023)
0.036
Higher education 313 0.256
(0.025)
461 0.213
(0.019)
0.043
Religion:
Protestant 313 0.518
(0.028)
461 0.477
(0.023)
0.040
Voodooist 313 0.061
(0.014)
461 0.061
(0.011)
-0.000
Catholic 313 0.399
(0.028)
461 0.434
(0.023)
-0.034
Believe in supernatural death 313 0.243
(0.464)
461 0.314
(0.429)
-0.071***
Occupation:
Unemployed 313 0.169
(0.021)
461 0.152
(0.017)
0.017
Student 313 0.383
(0.028)
461 0.315
(0.022)
0.069**
Civil servant 313 0.128
(0.019)
461 0.100
(0.014)
0.028
Peasant & Fisherman 313 0.304
(0.026)
461 0.354
(0.022)
-0.050
Asset ownership:
Television 313 0.444
(0.028)
461 0.432
(0.023)
0.012
Private-car/motorbike 313 0.147
(0.020)
461 0.145
(0.016)
0.002
Bicycle 313 0.029
(0.009)
461 0.067
(0.012)
-0.038**
Own mobile phone 313 0.882
(0.018)
461 0.874
(0.015)
0.008
Dwelling characteristics:
Access to electricity 313 0.565
(0.028)
461 0.573
(0.023)
-0.007
Stone house 313 0.300
(0.026)
461 0.254
(0.020)
0.047
Brick or concrete house 313 0.419
(0.028)
461 0.469
(0.023)
-0.050
Corrugated iron roof 313 0.770
(0.024)
461 0.744
(0.020)
0.026
No land ownership 309 0.576
(0.028)
457 0.551
(0.023)
0.025
Community involvement:
Church organization 313 0.511
(0.028)
461 0.525
(0.023)
-0.014
Social & political association 313 0.482
(0.028)
461 0.456
(0.023)
0.027
Cooperative (fonkoze´) 313 0.086
(0.016)
461 0.076
(0.012)
0.010
Rosca (sol) 313 0.144
(0.020)
461 0.121
(0.015)
0.022
Notes : These summary statistics are based on the participants’ responses to the survey.
The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
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Table B2: Non-parametric test of the difference in
distributions in the image lottery
All price=2 price=3
P-values
Catholic = Protestant 0.71 0.5160 0.341
Catholic = Voodoo 0.143 0.1047 0.697
Voodoo = Protestant 0.018 0.0918 0.109
N. 774 490 284
Table B3: Non-parametric test of the difference in distributions in the
neutral and image lottery
All Image Buyers Non-buyers
P-values
Neutral = Image (mean) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0093
Neutral = Voodoo Image 0.0022 0.0303 0.0357
Neutral = Protestant Image 0.0000 0.0000 0.0626
Neutral = Catholic Image 0.0000 0.0000 0.0301
N. 774 461 313
Notes: The table reports significance tests of the difference of the distribution of
the bets, expressed as share of the endowment, for neutral and image lottery for
all and by type of players (buyers and non-buyers).
Table B4: Mean and Wilcoxon distribution test for the
share bet with different price treatments
price=2 price=3 P-values
Distribution Mean
Neutral 0.53 0.52 0.6536 0.6169
N. 490 284
Notes: The Table presents for each of the price treatments the
mean of the share bet in neutral and images lotteries. The Dis-
tribution test is a Wilcoxon distribution test and the Mean test is
the t-test.
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C Theory
C.1 General
Consider a lottery in which the subject has an endowment e, and can choose to keep
some of this or allocate a stake b to a lottery that pays a multiple of the stake mb with
a probability that the individual believes to be p.
The lottery pays zero otherwise. Let us first consider the case where purchasing a
religious image is not an option. We refer to this setting as “neutral”. Assuming the
players are expected utility maximizers, the maximization problem of any of them in the
neutral lottery is:
Maxb EU(b) = (1− p)u(e− b) + pu(e+ (m− 1)b) (7)
where u(x) is the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function characterizing the
individual attitude towards risk and p his/her probability of winning the lottery. If there
is an interior solution, the first order condition of this problem is
dEU(b)
db
= −(1− p)u′(e− b) + (m− 1)pu′(e+ (m− 1)b) = 0. (8)
There might also be corner solutions where the individual bets everything if dEU(b)
db
> 0
∀b ∈ [0, e], or nothing if dEU(b)
db
< 0 ∀b ∈ [0, e]. From this we can show the following
result.
Lemma 1 For continuous betting strategies, any individuals who bets zero in the lottery
must believe the lottery is weakly actuarially unfair, i.e. must believe that p ≤ 1
m
Proof of Lemma 1: First, weakly risk-loving individuals bet everything b = e if
Eb = pmb > b. Secondly, for risk-averse individuals to bet zero it must be the case that
dEU(b)
db
≤ 0 for all b ∈ [0, e]. If u(b) is weakly concave then dEU(b)
db
is weakly decreas-
ing in b. It is nonpositive everywhere if and only if it is nonpositive at b = 0, so that
dEU(b)
db b=0
= −(1− p)u′(e) + (m− 1)pu′(e) = −(1− pm)u′(e) ≤ 0.
This implies that dEU(b)
db b=0
≤ 0 if and only if mp ≤ 1. QED.
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C.2 Exploiting the neutral lottery game
The subjects have an endowment of e = 10 coins that they can share as they wish
between keeping it (no risk but low return) and the risky lottery, which has a high re-
turn (i.e. a return of 2 for an investment of 1 with a probability of success of 0.6). In
other words, our lottery is actuarially more than fair (i.e., 0.6 > 1
2
) so that, by virtue of
Lemma 1 each player would like to bet something positive if continuous bets are allowed.23
One concern with this result is that, because the lemma holds for continuous betting
strategies, it does not necessarily apply to experimental settings where subjects bet in
discontinuous units of 0, 1, 2, 3.... Our subjects have to solve (7) for b ∈ {0, 1, ..., 10}.
Even if some strictly positive bet greater than zero but less than one would be preferable,
a subject may bet zero because it is preferable to betting the smallest discrete positive
bet available.
The first point revealed by our experiment is that close to 6 percent of the players do
not bet anything in the neutral lottery game. Betting 0 might reflect the fact that our
subjects being forced to bet either 0 or 1 they prefer betting 0 than 1. For this to be true
it must be the case that u(10) > 0.4u(9)+0.6u(11), which is equivalent to u(10)−u(9)
u(11)−u(10) > 1.5.
To exploit our empirical observations we assume, as it is standard in the literature,
that the preferences of our subjects are represented by a CRRA utility function: u(x) =
x1−ρ
1−ρ with ρ > 0 and ρ 6= 1. Substituting the CRRA utility function in (7) and e = 10
optimization with respect to b yields as FOC:
EU ′(b) = −(1− p)(10− b)−ρ + p(10 + b)−ρ (9)
where p denotes the individual’s probability of winning the lottery.
23Whatever the Von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function characterizing the individual at-
titude towards risk it cannot lead to a continuous bet of 0 if the individual believes that pˆ = p = 0.6.
FOC yields dEU(b)db = −0.4u′(10 − b) + 0.6u′(10 + b) = 0, which is sufficient as u(x) is strictly concave.
With our specification of the lottery there is always a value of b > 0 such that the FOC holds.
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When ρ > 0 we obtain an interior solution for b such that EU ′(b) = 0. Let
q = min
1,
(
1− p
p
) 1
ρ
 (10)
We deduce that the optimal betting strategy b0 for an individual characterized by a
CRRA utility function with parameter ρ ∈ (0,+∞) and probability of winning p is:
b0 =
10(1− q)
1 + q
(11)
It is easy to check that if p = 0.6 then limρ→0 b0 = 10 and limρ→+∞ b0 = 0.
The FOC in (2) is equivalent to:
q(b0) =
10− b0
10 + b0
(12)
From an empirical point of view the observation of the betting strategy of the players,
b0, in the neutral lottery game, allows us to deduce the value of q0 = q(b0), which is
a combination of the individual’s perceived probability of winning the lottery and their
risk aversion. In particular if they bet 0 it implies that q0 = 1. We exploit the betting
behavior of the subjects in the neutral lottery game to compute q0 = q(b0) according to
(4) for each subject.
C.3 Exploiting the lotteries with images
We exploit next the games where the players are obliged to buy an image. Let t ∈ {2, 3}
denote the price of the religious image. The FOC for the betting behavior of players
who do not update their probability of winning the lottery, nor their risk aversion, in the
presence of religious image which cost t ∈ {2, 3} is:
EU ′(b) = −(1− p)(10− t− b)−ρ + p(10− t+ b)−ρ (13)
Let q be the solution to equation (3). We deduce that the optimal betting strategy for
an individual characterized by a CRRA utility function with parameter ρ ∈ (0,+∞) and
probability of winning p and income 10− t is: b(t) = (10−t)(1−q)
1+q
.
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Substituting q0 from (4) computed with b0, the betting behavior of our subjects in
the neutral case, we compute for each player:
b(t) =
(10− t)(1− q0)
1 + q0
. (14)
To make comparisons of betting behavior meaningful we compute the percentage of
the net endowment that each player gambles in each game. In the neutral game this per-
centage is simply obtained by multiplying b0, the amount gambled in the neutral game
by 10: x0 = 10b0. In the games with the images, the endowment is lower by either
20% or 30% (we can call this a revenue effect). Let t = 2 or t = 3 be the randomized
cost of playing with a religious image, and let bt be the actual bet chosen by the player
when t ∈ {2, 3}. The percentage of the net endowment gambled by the player is xt = 100bt10−t .
It is straightforward to check that if bt = b(t) (i.e., if the player does not update
his/her subjective probability of winning the lottery, nor his/her risk aversion, in presence
of religious image) then xt = xo. In other words if only a revenue effect is in play then
the individuals should not change the percentage of their endowment they allocate to
the gamble. We know from section 4 that our individuals bet a larger share of their
endowment in presence of religious images so that on average bt > b(t).
D Questionnaire on religious practices
Note that the number in parenthesis refers to the number of the given question in the orig-
inal questionnaire. The questions were interspersed so as not to give undue prominence
to any one theme.
Bloc 1: Voodoo religious practice
1. (Q15) At the last birth of a child in your family, what medical care did you have?
• Hospital or clinic
• Doctor or nurse
• Midwife
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• Traditional doctor (“levepye”) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for
those who give this reply.
2. (Q17) What did you do to protect the child against jalousie, Djok, Lougawou?
• Prayer
• Bath =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• Mystical object (collier, centure de Djok, ...)
3. (Q17) What did you do to protect the child against jalousie, Djok, Lougawou?
• Prayer
• Bath
• Mystical object (collier, centure de Djok, ...) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the
value 1 for those who give this reply.
4. (Q18) In your opinion, what was the cause of the death of the last close person you
lost?
• Natural
• Supernatural =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this
reply.
5. (Q19) Which ceremonies did you perform for that person?
• Measuring the body (“retemo”) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for
those who give this reply.
• Vigil (“veille´e”)
• Funeral
• Last prayers
6. (Q31) Concerning the last case of serious illness in your family, what was the cause
of that sickness?
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• Natural
• Supernatural =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this
reply.
7. (Q33) Where did you go with this person for medical care?
• Hospital or clinic
• Church
• Doctor or nurse
• Traditional doctor (“levepye”) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for
those who give this reply.
8. (Q34) What measures did you take to protect this person against future sickness?
• None
• Modern medicine
• Traditional medicine
• Both =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply or
“Traditional Medicine”
9. (Q37) If you or a member of your family has been the victim of physical violence,
to whom did you go for help ?
• Nobody
• Police, lawyer, state authority
• Family, friends
• Priest or Pastor
• Traditional Practitioner =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those
who give this reply.
10. (Q45) In which type of ceremonies do you participate in your village?
50
• Protestant church
• Catholic church
• Feˆte patronale
• Guede (voodoo dance and ceremonies) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value
1 for those who give this reply.
11. (Q40) If you or a member of your family has been the victim of theft, to whom did
you go for help ?
• Nobody
• Police, lawyer, state authority
• Family, friends
• Priest or Pastor
• Traditional Practitioner =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those
who give this reply.
Bloc 2: General religiosity
1. (Q17) What did you do to protect the last child born in your family child against
jalousie, Djok, Lougawou?
• Prayer =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• Bath
• Mystical object (collier, centure de Djok, ...)
2. (Q19) Which ceremonies did you perform for the last close person you lost?
• Measuring the body (“retemo”)
• Vigil (“veille´e”) =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give
this reply.
• Funeral
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• Last prayers
3. (Q19) Which ceremonies did you perform for the last close person you lost?
• Measuring the body (“retemo”)
• Vigil (“veille´e”)
• Funeral =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• Last prayers
4. (Q19) Which ceremonies did you perform for the last close person you lost?
• Measuring the body (“retemo”)
• Vigil (“veille´e”)
• Funeral
• Last prayers =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this
reply.
5. (Q20) Do you clean the tomb of the deceased person every year?
• Yes =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• No
6. (Q33) Where did you take the last person with a serious illness for medical care?
• Hospital or clinic
• Church =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• Doctor or nurse
• Traditional doctor (“levepye”)
7. (Q37) If you or a member of your family has been the victim of physical violence,
to whom did you go for help ?
• Nobody
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• Police, lawyer, state authority
• Family, friends
• Priest or Pastor =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give
this reply.
• Traditional Practitioner
8. (Q23) Do you take into account the moon when you plant crops?
• Yes =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
• No
9. (Q45) In which type of ceremonies do you participate in your village?
• Protestant church =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give
this reply.
• Catholic church
• Feˆte patronale
• Guede (voodoo dance and ceremonies)
10. (Q45) In which type of ceremonies do you participate in your village?
• Protestant church
• Catholic church =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give
this reply.
• Feˆte patronale
• Guede (voodoo dance and ceremonies)
11. (Q44) In which type of social organization do you participate in your village?
• Religious organization =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who
give this reply.
• Political organization
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• Cooperative
• Rotating savings and credit association
12. (Q30) What measures do you take to protect your business activities from theft?
• None
• Lucky objects
• Prayer =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give this reply.
13. (Q40) If you or a member of your family has been the victim of theft, to whom did
you go for help ?
• Nobody
• Police, lawyer, state authority
• Family, friends
• Priest or Pastor =⇒ A dummy variable takes the value 1 for those who give
this reply.
• Traditional Practitioner
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